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— Note —
Walking a Tightrope:
Regulating Medicare Fraud and
Abuse and the Transition to
Value-Based Payment
“The current legal environment has created major barriers to
delivery system innovation. Innovation will not occur if each
novel way to organize and pay for care needs to be adjudicated
case-by-case or is threatened with legal proceedings.”1

Abstract
As the American health care system undergoes a fundamental
shift from paying for health care on a fee-for-service basis to one
based on value, providers are faced with the question of how to
structure the business arrangements necessary to operate in a valuebased market while simultaneously complying with the existing fraudand-abuse regulatory framework. The passage of health care reform
ushered in an era of rapid change in how health care is delivered, but
the underlying regulatory structure within which health care business
arrangements must reside has not kept pace with these changes.
Consequently, providers are left to question whether their business
arrangements comply with prior laws and regulations. While the
government has recognized the inherent disconnect between the valuebased care framework and the regulatory regime predicated on fee-forservice financial incentives, policy makers have not offered a
permanent solution.
This Note addresses the fundamental conflict between paying for
the value of care where providers assume risk for the management of
a population’s health in more tightly integrated care settings and the
application of a fraud-and-abuse framework that came about because
of perverse incentives in fee-for-service reimbursement. The discussion
includes a review of the waiver authority granted by Congress as part
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which has
facilitated certain innovative, value-based pilots, and evaluates the
scope and long-term viability of this approach. While the waivers
have, to a certain extent, permitted the development of the business
relationships required to assume risk and receive value-based
payments, they have left unanswered many questions that continue to
cause providers to act cautiously. The resulting hesitation by
1.

Timothy S. Jost & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Legal Reforms Necessary to
Promote Delivery System Innovation, 299 JAMA 2561, 2561 (2008).
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providers to implement value-based reforms has chilled the pace of
innovation. This Note argues for a new approach to regulating health
care fraud and abuse in an era of expanded value-based payment and
highly integrated provider relationships. This approach considers the
role of the fee-for-service regulatory framework in light of new
incentives to deliver high quality, value-based care and builds on the
steps already taken to ensure integrity within the Medicare Shared
Savings Program.
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Introduction
The portion of the United States economy devoted to paying for
health care has more than doubled over the last forty years.2 Efforts
to curtail the rate of growth and reduce spending have a long history
and have achieved varying degrees of success. The onset of large
governmental payers like Medicare3 and Medicaid4 in 1965 and the
corresponding increase in health care expenditures focused the
attention of policymakers who sought to preserve the financial
integrity of the programs.
Perhaps as a function of reimbursing providers on a fee-for-service
basis, the problem of providers paying kickbacks in exchange for
referrals became a significant threat to the financial health of the
federal programs.5 In 1972, Congress realized the detrimental effect
these improper payment arrangements could have on the solvency of
the programs and made it a crime to knowingly offer or receive
“remuneration” in exchange for the referral of health services financed
by the Medicare and Medicaid programs.6 The anti-kickback statute
and its associated safe harbors have since become one of the hallmark
structural regulations aimed at mitigating fraud and abuse in the
federal health care programs.
Throughout the 1980s, the effort to contain costs through
managed care utilization controls, coupled with Medicare’s
prospective payment system,7 created incentives for physicians to
engage in entrepreneurial business practices that could take advantage
of a reimbursement system based on payment for each separate
service provided.8 These arrangements included the provision of in2.

See Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Costs: A
Primer 4 (2012), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670-03.pdf
(noting that the share of the United States economy “devoted to health
care grew from 7.2% in 1970 to 17.9% in 2010”).

3.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395hhh (2006).

4.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (2006).

5.

See Richard P. Kusserow, The Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback
Statute and the Safe Harbor Regulations—What’s Next?, 2 Health
Matrix 49, 69 (1992) (“Congress passed the anti-kickback statute
because of its justifiably serious concern over the consequences that
payment for referrals has on the Federal health programs . . . .”).

6.

Id. at 49–53. The statute is commonly referred to as the anti-kickback
statute and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).

7.

See discussion infra Part I.A.

8.

See Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 Annals
Health L. 15, 16–17 (2011) (describing various practice arrangements
that physicians began to develop in response to cost containment,
partially attributable to the Medicare prospective payment system);
David Mechanic, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care, 45 J. Health &
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office ancillary and laboratory services, physician ownership of
diagnostic imaging centers and durable medical equipment companies,
and physician investment in outpatient surgery centers. Physicians
were able to supplement the reduction in income that they
experienced as a result of managed care by referring patients for
treatment at a facility in which they had a financial interest.9
Seeking to curtail this practice, Representative Fortney “Pete”
Stark sponsored legislation that would bar Medicare and Medicaid
patient referrals by any physician to a facility providing designated
health services in which the physician or a member of her family had
an investment interest or a compensation arrangement.10 The statute,
by its very nature, presumed that all existing referrals made to
entities with physician ownership interests or compensation
arrangements were illegal unless the parties to such arrangements
could satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions in the statute or those
later promulgated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS).11
Together, the anti-kickback statute and the Stark law, along with
provisions of the False Claims Act12 and the Civil Monetary Penalties
(CMP) provision of the Social Security Act,13 formed the basis from
which the federal government regulated the structural relationships
within the health care sector. It is against this background that
innovations in provider reimbursement gained traction in the early
2000s, as health policy experts began to question the effectiveness of
paying providers for the volume of services provided with little
consideration of the value or quality of care delivered.14 As
experiments for value-based payment began to show signs of success,
so too did they begin to highlight the restrictive nature of the
underlying fraud-and-abuse regulatory scheme. In many instances,
Soc. Behav. 76, 81 (2004) (“As employee complaints increased and the
public expressed dissatisfaction with restrictions on choice, both
employers and health plans retreated by relaxing the utilization controls
that gave managed care advantages in constraining costs . . . . [P]rivate
plans and provider groups showed ingenuity in devising new types of
practice arrangements that adapted to changing circumstances.”).
9.

Sutton, supra note 8, at 16–17.

10.

Id. at 24–25.

11.

Id. at 25. At the time, CMS was referred to as the Health Care
Financing Administration, or HCFA.

12.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006). The Civil False Claims Act allows the
government to recover civil penalties from individuals and permits
“quitam” actions brought by individuals on behalf of the government.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006).

13.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006).

14.

See discussion infra Part II.B.
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these regulations either prohibited, or made very risky, a number of
integrated provider relationships that were required to form successful
value-based payment arrangements.
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)15
formally blessed several of the value-based payment initiatives that
showed early success in pilot arrangements and encouraged broader
adoption by providers. The regulatory framework within which these
legally enshrined initiatives are to operate, however, has not changed.
Perhaps realizing the difficulty in structuring the provider
arrangements necessary for receiving value-based payments, Congress
granted waiver authority to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, which provides for the waiver of various fraud-and-abuse
laws and regulations—namely the anti-kickback statute, Stark, and
several CMP provisions—for entities participating in various payment
programs.16
This Note highlights the incongruity between the existing health
care regulatory framework and modern forms of value-based
payments. It argues that the fraud-and-abuse waivers are unduly
narrow and do not provide sufficient guidance to providers who may
at some point become technically noncompliant with a specific
requirement of the value-based payment program. This Note goes on
to explore ways in which legislators and policy makers can implement
changes into the waiver program to facilitate the broader transition to
value-based payments in the short term. The long-term challenge,
however, involves making a more permanent transition from the
structural approach to regulating fraud and abuse to an approach
that obviates the need for blanket waivers. This approach would build
on the quality reporting, transparency, and accountability
requirements that CMS uses to protect against program abuse in the
Medicare Shared Savings Program. The lingering issue for legislators
is defining the future role of the underlying statutes from which a
growing number of providers are receiving waivers to structure their
business arrangements.
Part I provides an historical overview of the Medicare fee-forservice reimbursement system and the fraud-and-abuse provisions
enacted in that era to combat the effects of essentially paying for the
volume of services provided. Part II explains recent developments in
the move to pay providers according to the value of care, including
early value-based payment demonstration projects that were
expanded in the ACA.
15.

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

16.

See id. § 1899(f) (granting the Secretary of Health and Human Services
the authority to waive fraud-and-abuse provisions to carry out
demonstration projects under the ACA).
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Part III elaborates on the disconnect between the current
structural regulations concerning relationships among health care
providers and the provisions of the ACA that encourage innovative
payment-for-value models. Part IV then discusses the implications of
this disconnect and critiques aspects of the regulatory waivers that
have left many questions unanswered. Finally, Part V offers shortterm proposals regarding the use of fraud-and-abuse waivers and
contemplates the long-term application and viability of the structural
regulations whose provisions are waived under the value-based
payment approach.

I.

Medicare Reimbursement and Structural
Regulation in the Pre-Reform Era

Before passage of the ACA in March 2010, the Medicare program
had engaged in a handful of payment experiments but never
implemented them on a larger scale.17 Up to that point, Medicare paid
physicians and hospitals primarily on the volume of care they
provided, with little or no emphasis on the quality or value of that
care. Though the movement to pay providers based on the value of
care had its followers,18 the unrestrained growth of Medicare
expenditures without a corresponding increase in quality outcomes19
prompted an unambiguous embrace of the principles of value-based
payment in the formulation of the ACA.20 In order to better
understand the movement toward paying for value, it is important to
first understand the structure of Medicare fee-for-service payment and
some of its inherent effects.
A.

Structure of Medicare Fee-for-Service Payments

Hospitals that provide services to beneficiaries covered by Part A
of the Medicare program receive payment through the Inpatient
17.

See discussion infra Part II.

18.

See, e.g., Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Paying for Quality: Providers’
Incentives for Quality Improvement, 23 Health Aff. 127, 127 (2004)
(noting the increasing use by individual purchasers, coalitions, and
health plans of “pay-for-performance systems to reward providers for
delivering high-quality care and to motivate quality improvement”).

19.

Instead of an increase in quality as a result of higher spending, the
Dartmouth Atlas Project found that higher rates of spending in certain
geographic locations of the country were associated with lower quality
outcomes. Elliott Fisher et al., Health Care Spending, Quality, and
Outcomes: More Isn’t Always Better, Dartmouth Inst. for Health
Pol’y & Clinical Prac. 2 (2009), available at http://www.
dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Spending_Brief_022709.pdf.

20.

For a discussion of value-based payments implemented since the passage
of the ACA, see infra Part II.
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Prospective Payment System (IPPS).21 The payment is based on the
categorization of the patient’s principal diagnosis upon discharge,
along with up to eight comorbidities or complications, according to
diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs.22 CMS sets the per-discharge
payment rates for 746 of these groups based on the severity of the
patient’s case.23 Different weights are assigned to DRGs based on the
“relative intensity of resource consumption.”24 These weights are then
multiplied by standardized amounts for labor, non-labor, and capital
costs, the sum of which represents the cost of an average case treated
in an efficient hospital.25 Upon calculating the base payment, CMS
makes a series of adjustments that apply based on the unique
characteristics of the hospital and its patient population.26
Physicians who provide care to patients covered by Part B of
Medicare are paid according to the Resource-Based Relative Value
Scale (RBRVS).27 Like the DRG system used in Part A, the RBRVS
is a prospective payment system that accounts for the resources used
to deliver care to patients in settings outside of the hospital. The
three components, called relative value units (RVUs), account for
physician work, practice expense, and malpractice coverage, and they
vary according to a geographic practice cost index. Each of the RVUs
is summed and multiplied by a conversion factor approved by
21.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2006) (created by the Social Security Amendments
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65 as an alternative to costbased reimbursement).

22.

Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials and
Problems 786–87 (6th ed. 2008).

23.

Hospital Acute Inpatient Services Payment System, MedPAC 1 (Oct.
2009) [hereinafter MedPAC, Payment Primer], available at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_11_
hospital.pdf.

24.

Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 787.

25.

Id.

26.

MedPAC, Payment Primer, supra note 23, at 3–5. A series of
adjustments are made to the base payment amounts. Hospitals that
treat with cost-increasing technologies are eligible to receive add-on
payments based on the technology’s newness and clinical benefit. Id. at
3. Medicare will cover up to seventy percent of the bad debts incurred
by hospitals as a result of Medicare beneficiaries not paying deductibles
and copayments, if the hospitals made a reasonable effort to collect the
unpaid amounts. Id. Other policy adjustments paid as per-case add-ons
include indirect graduate medical education payments to assist hospitals
that incur higher costs while training resident physicians,
disproportionate share payments to offset the cost of treating large lowincome populations, and outlier payments that provide extra
reimbursement if a case is extraordinarily costly. Id. at 3–4.

27.

Passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-4(a)–(j)).
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Congress.28 Perhaps recognizing the potential for unrestrained growth
under a fee-for-service prospective payment model, Congress initially
froze payment rates. The effort was futile, however, because
physicians altered their practice behavior and increased the volume of
services provided to patients to compensate for the reduction in
revenue.29 After several failed attempts to address physician volume
increases, Congress developed the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR)
formula to calculate the increase (or decrease) in the conversion factor
that ultimately determines RBRVS payments.30 The formula seeks to
keep Part B expenditures in line with overall economic growth and is
based on, among other things, the estimated change in physician fees,
the number of fee-for-service beneficiaries, and the estimated growth
in real gross domestic product.31 In the early years after
implementation of this formula, expenditures remained below the
target, which allowed Congress to approve conversion factor
increases.32 In 2002, however, Part B expenditures began to exceed
SGR targets, and Congress reduced payments by 4.8%.33 Every year
since then, expenditures have exceeded the formula’s target, but
Congress has overridden the mandated reductions, or, in at least three
instances, approved payment increases.34 As a result of Congress’s
refusal to adhere to the formula, the 2012 SGR update mandated a
29.5% reduction in provider payments.35
B.

The Inherent Effects of Fee-for-Service Payment

The fee-for-service reimbursement system used to pay hospitals
and physicians for providing care to Medicare patients encourages
greater volume of care, regardless of its quality or necessity.36 The
28.

Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 790.

29.

Id.

30.

Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4503, 111 Stat. 251,
433 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(f)).

31.

Jim Hahn & Janemarie Mulvey, Cong. Research Serv., R40907,
Medicare Physician Payment Updates and the Sustainable
Growth Rate (SGR) System 3 (2010).

32.

Id. at 4.

33.

Id. at 5–6.

34.

Id.

35.

MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare and the Health
Care Delivery System 183 (2011), http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/jun11_entirereport.pdf.

36.

Rick Mayes, Moving (Realistically) from Volume-Based to Value-Based
Health Care Payment in the USA Starting with Medicare Payment
Policy, 16 J. Health Servs. Res. & Pol’y, 249, 249 (2011); see also
Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance—Emerging Models
of Provider-Payment Reform, 359 New Eng. J. Med. 1197, 1197
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incentive to provide care according to volume is two-fold. First,
increasing the number or the intensity of procedures is a rational
response to cost-containment initiatives that result in reduced income
to physician practices.37 Studies dating back to the beginning of the
DRG payment system have identified the phenomenon of “physicianinduced demand,” which posits that physicians respond to reduced
practice income by performing a greater volume of procedures.38
Second, physicians respond to financial incentives present in the fee
schedules by providing services for which they can obtain
reimbursement and by minimizing procedures that are not
reimbursed.39 Since Medicare fee schedules do not reimburse providers
for chronic care coordination, disease management, or other qualityimproving activities, providers tend to perform more procedures for
which reimbursement is possible, thus “fail[ing] to promote or even
discourag[ing] optimal treatment.”40
The encouragement that the fee-for-service reimbursement model
provides physicians also has dramatic implications for cost
containment. A recent article estimated that wasteful spending arising
from providing care to patients that will not help them and from
physician-induced demand was between $158 billion and $226 billion
in 2011.41 This dramatic level of spending on care that does lead to
better outcomes has been the primary driver of the shift to valuebased payments.
C.

The Current Health Care Regulatory Structure

The current regulatory structure in Medicare is largely a product
of Congress’s response to the incentives created by the fee-for-service
system. The statutes described below have attempted to counteract
the natural response of providers to provide more care because each
additional service can be billed with little or no scrutiny as to its
value. These regulations embody Congress’s concern with the
structural relationships of providers and focus on regulating their
business arrangements and restricting compensation agreements,

(2008); Maria T. Currier & Morris H. Miller, Medicare Payment
Reform: Accelerating the Transformation of the U.S. Healthcare
Delivery System and Need for New Strategic Provider Alliances,
Health Law., Feb. 2010, at 1.
37.

Sandra Christensen, Volume Responses to Exogenous Changes in
Medicare’s Payment Policies, 27 Health Servs. Res. 65, 66 (1992).

38.

Id.

39.

Mayes, supra note 36, at 249.

40.

Rosenthal et al., supra note 18, at 127.

41.

Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US
Health Care, 307 JAMA 1513, 1514 (2012).
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ownership interests, and referral patterns.42 While significant and
ongoing academic debate continues regarding the efficacy of these
statutes, this Note will focus primarily on the impact these provisions
are having on the implementation and expansion of value-based
payment initiatives currently being introduced to the Medicare
program.
1.

The Anti-Kickback Statute

In 1972, Congress enacted the anti-kickback statute to curb
“certain practices which have long been regarded by professional
organizations as unethical and which contribute appreciably to the
cost of the [M]edicare and [M]edicaid programs.”43 Prior to its
enactment of the modern-day anti-kickback statute, the law
prohibited only “misrepresentations to obtain Medicare and Medicaid
payments rather than attacking kickback abuses head on.”44 By
enacting this new provision, Congress sought to broaden the scope of
prohibited conduct to include knowing or willful payment or receipt of
“any remuneration” in exchange for referring an individual, or in
exchange for purchasing, leasing, or ordering an item financed by a
federal health care program.45
42.

See Kristin Madison, Rethinking Fraud Regulation by Rethinking the
Health Care System, 32 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 411, 422 (2011)
(“[P]ayers’ and patients’ inability to directly evaluate utilization and
assess quality leads to a regulatory regime reliant on an indirect,
structural approach that imposes high costs in terms of innovations
foregone.”).

43.

H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, at 107 (1972); see also Anne W. Morrison, An
Analysis of Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral Law in Modern Health
Care, 21 J. Legal Med. 351, 354 (2000) (quoting the House Report
transcript).

44.

Morrison, supra note 43, at 354.

45.

A series of amendments in 1980, and again in 1987, resulted in the
current language of the anti-kickback statute:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind—
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good,
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than
five years, or both.
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While the Statute requires a person to knowingly or willfully
violate its provisions, some courts, namely the Eleventh Circuit, have
interpreted the intent requirement more broadly to include conduct
that a defendant knows any aspect of which is unlawful.46 Other
courts, however, have required the government to meet a higher
standard by proving that the defendants knew the law “prohibit[ed]
offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals” and that
defendants “engage[d] in conduct with the specific intent to violate
the law.”47 Congress clarified the Statute’s intent requirement in the
ACA by codifying the broad interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit.48
After passage of such a broadly worded prohibition in 1972,
providers hesitated to form new business and payment arrangements
out of fear that they would face criminal liability or exclusion from
Medicare.49 This prompted Congress, in 1987, to grant authority to
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind—
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good,
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than
five years, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
46.

See United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838–40 (11th Cir. 1998)
(noting that a defendant need not act with knowledge that he is
violating a specific rule; knowledge of general illegality of conduct is
sufficient).

47.

Corrine Propas Parver & Allison Cohen, The Affordable Care Act:
Strengthening Compliance Through Health Care Fraud Provisions, 5
Health L. & Pol’y Brief, no. 1, 2011, at 5–6 (quoting Hanlester
Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995)).

48.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
6402(f), 124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010) (provision codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(h)). The amendment states that the government need not
prove that an individual had actual knowledge of the statute or specific
intent to violate its terms. Id.

49.

See, e.g., Kusserow, supra note 5, at 51–52 (noting that the broad
language of the statute created uncertainty, which caused providers to
be reluctant to “engage in many arrangements which were not harmful
to the programs and beneficiaries, and which may have even been
helpful”); Morrison, supra note 43, at 355 (noting a “growing concern
regarding the vagueness and ambiguity of important terminology” found
in anti-kickback statutes enacted prior to 1987).

1387

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Walking a Tightrope

the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate
safe harbor regulations that, if properly adhered to, would shield
providers from criminal and administrative action.50 Thus, in addition
to avoiding liability for failing to act with the requisite intent,
providers could minimize legal liability by ensuring that their business
and payment arrangements met the enumerated requirements of a
safe harbor.
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has issued twenty-five
safe harbors;51 however, the safe harbor for personal services and
management contracts is most relevant in the context of value-based
payments. A statutory exclusion for bona fide employment
relationships, while not a regulatory safe harbor, is also commonly
used in the context of value-based arrangements. The safe harbor for
personal services and management contracts exempts remuneration
paid as compensation to providers acting as agents on behalf of
principals52 and is commonly used for medical directorships53 where
directors receive a salary but are not employed by the hospital. In
order to satisfy the requirements, the agreement between the hospital
and the physician must, among other things, be in writing and signed
by the parties, specify all of the services that the physician will
provide over the term, be in place for more than one year, and
provide compensation that is consistent with fair market value and
not dependent on the “volume or value of any referrals.”54

50.

Kusserow, supra note 5, at 52.

51.

See Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1070–71.

52.

42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (2012).

53.

Medical directors typically oversee clinical departments within the
hospital or supervise the entire medical staff. See, e.g., Harry A.
Sultz & Kristina M. Young, Health Care USA 82–83 (6th ed.
2009) (describing the structure commonly found in the medical divisions
of many hospitals).

54.

42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(5). Additional requirements include a schedule
of exact intervals for services, if they are provided on a sporadic or parttime basis. It should describe the exact length and charge for such
intervals. Compensation must be consistent with amounts in armslength transactions. Id. § 1001.952(d)(3). Lastly, the agreement must be
commercially reasonable, which OIG interprets as having “intrinsic
commercial value” to the purchaser that is “reasonably calculated to
further the business of the . . . purchaser, and must be . . . services that
the . . . purchaser needs, intends to utilize, and does utilize in
furtherance of its commercially reasonable business objectives.” Linda A.
Baumann, Navigating the New Safe Harbors to the Anti-Kickback
Statute, Health Law., Feb. 2000, at 1, 6 (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518,
63,525 (Nov. 19, 1999)).
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Providers seeking to avoid anti-kickback liability have also relied
on the exclusion for bona fide employment.55 By employing
physicians, hospitals are able to structure referrals and payments in
ways that would not otherwise be protected by a safe harbor. It is
important to note that independent contractors are not protected by
the employment exception, and payments to independent contractors
would need to meet protections of another safe harbor, such as the
provision for personal services arrangements.56 OIG has adopted the
same definition of “employee” used by the Internal Revenue Service,
which is “any individual who would be considered an employee under
the usual common law rules applicable in determining the existence of
an employer-employee relationship.”57 While this exception provides
broad immunity from anti-kickback liability, the option to employ
physicians to minimize liability is not currently feasible for many
heath care organizations. As Part III.A discusses, hospitals seeking to
structure financial arrangements for participation in a value-based
reimbursement program face the difficult task of trying to minimize
liability under a statute that was designed, at least in part, to
prohibit such arrangements.
2.

The Stark Law

In the late 1980s, Congress turned its attention to the problem of
physician referrals to entities, especially clinical laboratories, with
which physicians had an ownership interest or a compensation
arrangement. A study ordered by Congress found that a sizable
number of physicians who sought Medicare reimbursement referred
patients to entities with which they had financial relationships.58
Because the Medicare Part B program paid physicians according to a
fee-for-service fee schedule, the prospect of physicians referring
patients for unnecessary procedures in order to bill Medicare was a
real threat to the program’s long-term solvency. Indeed, the OIG
55.

Instead of appearing in OIG’s safe harbor regulations, the employment
exemption appears in the statute itself, thus not technically constituting
a “safe harbor.” The prohibition “shall not apply to any amount paid by
an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide employment
relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of
covered items or services.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) (2006).

56.

Kusserow, supra note 5, at 60–61.

57.

Id. at 60 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,987 (July 29, 1991)).

58.

Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., OAI-12-88-01410, Financial Arrangements Between
Physicians and Health Care Businesses: Report to Congress iii
(1989) [hereinafter OIG Report], available at https://oig.
hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-12-88-01410.pdf (finding that twelve percent of
Medicare physicians have a financial relationship with the entities to
which they make patient referrals).
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report noted that patients of physicians who owned or invested in
outside clinical laboratories received 45 percent more services than
other Medicare patients.59 To combat this problem, the OIG Report
identified six options for policymakers hoping to tackle the problem of
physician self-referral.60 Emboldened by the OIG report and the
estimated $28 million associated with physician self-referral to clinical
laboratories,61 Congress, led by Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark,
implemented the first prohibition on physician referrals for clinical
laboratory services to entities with which the physician or a family
member had a financial relationship.62 This prohibition, referred to as
“Stark I,” paved the way for additional studies of physician referral
behavior and resulted in additional prohibitions that were enacted
in 1993.63
In its current form, the Stark law prohibits physician referrals of
Medicare or Medicaid patients for designated health services to
entities with which the physician or a family member has a financial
interest or compensation arrangement.64 This broad prohibition does
not require violators to act with a particular mental state. Instead, it
adopts a “bright line” test for liability, which renders any such
transaction unlawful unless it meets an exception.65 Entities that
59.

Id.

60.

The report recommended (1) implementing “a post payment utilization
review by carriers directed at physicians who either own or invest in
other health care entities,” (2) requiring physicians to disclose their
financial interest to patients, (3) improving enforcement of existing antikickback protections, (4) instituting a private right of action for
kickbacks, (5) prohibiting physician referrals to certain entities to which
they have a financial interest, or (6) prohibiting physician referrals to all
entities to which they have a financial interest. Id. at iv; see also
Sutton, supra note 8, at 19 (commenting on the results of the OIG
Report).

61.

OIG Report, supra note 58, at iii.

62.

Sutton, supra note 8, at 19. The provision was passed as part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 and took effect on January
1, 1992. Id.

63.

The additional referral prohibitions, referred to as “Stark II,” were
passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 13562, 107 Stat. 312, 596.

64.

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2006). Designated health services include clinical
laboratory services, physical therapy services, occupational therapy
services, radiology services, radiation therapy services, durable medical
equipment, parenteral and enteral nutrients and equipment, prosthetics,
orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies, home health services,
outpatient prescription drugs, and inpatient and outpatient hospital
services. Id. § 1395nn(h)(6).

65.

See Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1082. Stark’s exceptions are
classified as those applying to ownership or investment financial
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receive overpayments because of a failure to meet the criteria of one
of the exceptions must follow the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol
that was established pursuant to the ACA in September 2010.66
Penalties include repayment of the claims paid while the violation
existed,67 civil penalties of $15,000 per service for knowing violations,68
and exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs with
penalties up to $100,000 per service where evidence indicates a
regulatory circumvention scheme.69 CMS has the authority to issue
advisory opinions to entities requesting review of a specific transaction
or business arrangement; however, the opinion is binding “as to the
Secretary and the party or parties requesting the opinion.”70
Two Stark exceptions play a significant role in the structure of
compensation arrangements between hospitals and physicians
attempting to implement value-based payment programs. These
exceptions include the personal services exception71 and the bona fide
relationships, direct and indirect compensation arrangements, or are
generic exceptions to all financial arrangements. The law is
characterized as an “exceptions bill” that enacts a sweeping prohibition
and then carves out specific exceptions. Id. at 1084–85.
66.

See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Report to the
Congress: Implementation of the Medicare Self-Referral
Disclosure Protocol i (2012) [hereinafter SRDP Report], available
at
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelf
Referral/downloads/CMS-SRDP-Report-to-Congress.pdf. The disclosing
parties must submit information detailing: the nature of the violation;
the duration of the violation; the circumstances leading to the discovery
of the violation and steps taken to address and prevent future issues;
disclosure of any previous similar conduct or enforcement actions; the
existence of any compliance program; if applicable, any notices provided
to other government agencies; and whether the matter is under
government investigation. Id. at 5. The disclosing party must also
provide a legal analysis of the suspected violation and identify elements
of the exception that were and were not satisfied, and, in addition,
specify the time frame in which the violative arrangement existed. Id.
The repayment must be accompanied by a financial analysis that
includes “a total amount actually or potentially due . . . as a result of
the disclosed violation,” a description of the methodology used to
calculate the amount, the total remuneration that involved physicians
(or their family members) received, and a “summary of audit activity
and documents used in the audit.” Id. at 6.

67.

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2).

68.

§ 1395nn(g)(3).

69.

§ 1395nn(g)(4).

70.

§ 1395nn(g)(6).

71.

§ 1395nn(e)(3). This exception is commonly used for compensation
arrangements between hospitals and independent physicians occupying
management or other hospital-affiliated positions. The exception
requires the arrangement to be set out in writing, be signed by the
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employment relationships exception.72 As this Note argues in later
sections, these exceptions to the Stark law provide inadequate
protections to providers seeking to re-align physician payments with
value-based metrics.73
3.

Civil Monetary Penalties Statute

The Civil Monetary Penalties (CMP) statute,74 while more
straightforward than the anti-kickback and Stark laws, presents
perhaps the most significant obstacle to the implementation of valuebased payment initiatives and thus plays an important role in the
discussion of the current regulatory framework. The statute prohibits
any hospital from knowingly making a payment to a physician as an
inducement to reduce or limit services provided to Medicare or
Medicaid beneficiaries under the direct care of the physician.75
Hospitals making such payments can be liable for civil penalties of up
to $2,000 for each beneficiary for which a payment is made.76
Physicians who knowingly accept the payment may themselves be
liable for up to $2,000 for each beneficiary for which a payment
is made.77
The OIG has interpreted the statutory language broadly to
prohibit any payment that is intended to influence the physician to
reduce or limit items or services.78 Further clarifying its reading of the

parties, and specify the services that will be covered. The services
contracted for must not “exceed those that are reasonable and necessary
for the legitimate business purposes of the arrangement[s].” Id. The
arrangement must last for at least one year, and the compensation must
be set out in advance, must not exceed fair market value, and must not
take into account the volume or value of any referrals. Id.
72.

§ 1395nn(e)(2). This exception provides broad protection for hospitalphysician transactions and compensation arrangements and its use has
grown as hospitals and physician organizations align to form
accountable care organizations. The exception requires employment to
be for identifiable services, and remuneration must be consistent with
fair market value and not be determined in a manner that takes into
account the volume or value of any referrals. Productivity bonuses are
not prohibited for services performed personally by the physician, and
remuneration under the agreement must be commercially reasonable. Id.

73.

See discussion infra Part III.

74.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006).

75.

§ 1320a-7a(b)(1).

76.

Id.

77.

§ 1320a-7a(b)(2).

78.

Anne B. Claiborne, Julia R. Hesse & Daniel T. Roble, Legal
Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in Healthcare, 35
Am. J.L. & Med. 442, 445 (2009).
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statute with respect to gainsharing,79 the OIG stated in 1999 that
appropriately structured gainsharing arrangements were prohibited,
without regard to necessity or prudence as informed by current
medical practice, even though they may provide financial benefit to
the provider without an adverse impact on the quality of care.80 The
CMP has complicated recent efforts by hospitals to implement
gainsharing agreements as part of broader value-based reimbursement
initiatives that would allow physicians to share in the overall cost
savings they deliver to the hospital.81 Recently, however, the OIG
signaled some willingness to relax its interpretation of the provision in
a series of advisory opinions82 that approved “carefully-tailored”
gainsharing agreements.83
Another provision of the CMP statute relating to beneficiary
inducement is applicable to value-based payment programs. The
statute prohibits offering remuneration to any Medicare or Medicaid
beneficiary that a person knows or should know is likely to influence
the beneficiary to seek care from a particular provider for which
payment is made under the Medicare or Medicaid programs.84 Certain
value-based delivery models conflict with this prohibition because
they offer items or services for free or below fair market value in an
attempt to influence patient behavior. As with the provision relating
to the reduction or limitation of services, there have been recent
79.

Gainsharing refers to arrangements where hospitals give physicians a
share of any reduction in the hospital’s costs that can be attributed to
the physician’s clinical behavior. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at
1079.

80.

Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for Hospital Payments to
Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg.
37,985 (July 14, 1999).

81.

See Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1079–80 (noting the
government’s concern for “black box” gainsharing arrangements in
which physicians receive money for overall cost savings without
disclosing what specific actions were taken to generate those savings).

82.

Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Advisory Opinion Nos. 05-01 to 05-06 (2005), available at
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/advisoryopinions/index.asp#2005.

83.

Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1080. Some narrowly targeted
agreements have been permitted where hospitals seek to reduce the use
of costly supplies and procedures, or where they seek to employ less
expensive clinical practices that reduce costs. Id. at 1079. Such
agreements have been carefully designed with significant safeguards,
including identification of the specific actions physicians are taking to
reduce costs, external medical review of each cost-savings measure, and
case-by-case evaluations with physician independence to choose the most
appropriate treatment. Id. at 1080.

84.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (2006).
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developments with the CMP for beneficiary inducement and the
OIG’s application of the provision to newer forms of value-based
payment. These developments are discussed in Part IV.

II. The Trend Toward Value-Based Payments
In recent years, Congress has become increasingly concerned with
the unrestrained growth in Medicare expenditures. This has been
attributed, at least in part, to a method of reimbursement that
rewards providers for increasing the volume and intensity of medical
procedures with little regard for their quality or value to the patient.85
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, or MedPAC, which
advises Congress on issues related to Medicare payment policy, has
encouraged Congress to develop payment reforms that focus on the
bundling of payments across care settings and providers.86 In addition,
the Commission recommended the development of integrated care
delivery systems, commonly referred to as Accountable Care
Organizations, or ACOs, which use incentives to produce “highquality, well-coordinated health care while containing growth in the
cost of such services.”87 Congress accepted these recommendations and
included authorizing language for their development in the ACA.88
A.

How Value-Based Payment Differs from Fee for Service

As discussed in the beginning of this Note, the chief criticism of
the fee-for-service model is that it functions to reward providing a
greater volume of care that tends to be more costly.89 To move
beyond blind reimbursement for services without any regard for their
value, reform advocates have encouraged value-based alternatives.
Paying for value attempts to realign the financial incentives of care
delivery by tying physician compensation to achievement of evidencebased clinical standards.90 While there has been significant praise for
85.

See Currier & Miller, supra note 36, at 1 (noting that Medicare should
transform “‘from being a passive bill-payer to an active purchaser of
healthcare’”) (citing Nancy McCall et al., Rates of Hospitalization for
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions in the Medicare+Choice
Population, 22 Health Care Fin. Rev. 127, 127 (2001)).

86.

Id. at 3.

87.

Id. at 5.

88.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a) (Supp. V 2011) (establishing the Medicare
Shared Savings Program and associated ACOs); 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(a)
(Supp. V 2011) (establishing the National Program on Payment
Bundling). These provisions and their implementation are discussed
infra Parts II.C–D.

89.

See discussion supra Part I.B.

90.

See Michael F. Cannon, Pay-for-Performance: Is Medicare a Good
Candidate?, 7 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 1, 3 (2007)
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the idea of linking Medicare payments to value and quality,
considerable difficulties in defining and measuring “value” and
“quality” have persisted.91 Despite these difficulties, CMS has been
experimenting with various forms of quality measurement in valuebased payment initiatives that began long before the ACA was even
contemplated.
B.

Value-Based Purchasing

One of the earliest Medicare value-driven demonstration projects
was the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), which
began in 2003. CMS attempted to determine whether financial
incentives could improve inpatient care measures in five high-cost
areas: acute myocardial infarction, coronary artery bypass surgery,
heart failure, community-acquired pneumonia, and hip and knee
replacement.92 Each hospital received a score based on composite
quality measures,93 the majority of which were process metrics that
indicated the percentage of patients who received a specified
treatment. Using composite data from these metrics, CMS awarded
two-percent bonus payments on hospital DRG payments for the
condition for hospitals in the top decile of participants.94 Hospitals in
the second decile received a one-percent bonus.95 In response to
criticism that the poorest-performing hospitals were not being
rewarded for their sustained improvement, payments were adjusted in
the second phase, which lasted from 2007 to 2009, to reward hospitals
that demonstrated year-over-year improvement.96 In 2011, CMS
(describing how financial rewards can be used to affect the performance
of a physician).
91.

For an excellent discussion of the difficulties and implications associated
with defining quality, see id. at 5–8. Cannon notes that quality can be
measured in four ways: patient outcomes, processes, structural factors
(facilities and equipment), and patient satisfaction. Id. at 5. These
quality measures are each associated with a unique set of benefits and
drawbacks and are likely to be impacted by the availability and quality
of the data used to calculate them. See id. at 7–10 (discussing the
numerous upsides and downsides likely to result from quality measures).

92.

David Mechanic, The Truth About Health Care: Why Reform
is Not Working in America 122 (2006).

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Premier Hospital
Quality Incentive Demonstration Rewarding Superior Quality
Care: Fact Sheet 3 (2011), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/QualityInitiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/
Downloads/HospitalPremierPressRelease-FactSheet.pdf (noting that
incentive payments were given to hospitals based on quality score
improvement over the past few years). The project extension also
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indicated that, among the 216 participating hospitals, the composite
quality score improved by an average of 18.6 percent across each of
the five measured areas.97
The results of this demonstration informed the design of the new
Value Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, which went into effect for
all Medicare-participating hospitals on October 1, 2012.98 Under the
new VBP Program,99 Medicare will withhold one percent of regular
DRG reimbursements, and, over the course of a year, money will be
paid to hospitals based on their adherence to clinical guidelines and
their performance on patient satisfaction surveys.100 Seventy percent
of the hospitals’ ratings correspond to clinical process measures, while
the remaining thirty percent is derived from satisfaction survey
responses from discharged patients.101
C.

Shared Savings Programs and the Development of ACOs

The Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration102
represented the first large-scale attempt to pay physicians according
imposed a one percent DRG penalty on hospitals that did not score
above the ninth decile in any clinical area in year four. A two percent
reduction was imposed for hospitals failing to score above the tenth
decile in any clinical area in year four. Id.
97.

Id. at 2.

98.

Jordan M. VanLare & Patrick H. Conway, Value-Based Purchasing—
National Programs to Move from Volume to Value, 367 New Eng. J.
Med. 292, 293 (2012); Jordan Rau, Medicare’s Pay for Performance
Effort Begins, Targeting Quality and Readmissions, Capsules: The
KHN Blog (Oct. 1, 2012, 6:06 AM), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.
org/index.php/2012/10/medicares-pay-for-performance-effort-beginstargeting-quality-and-readmissions/.

99.

The VBP Program was created by the ACA and appears at 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(o)(1) (Supp. V 2011).

100. Rau, supra note 98. A hospital’s performance may allow it to recoup
some of the DRG payment reduction, and hospitals that achieve higher
ratings can potentially receive extra. Hospitals that underperform will
likely fail to recoup the one percent DRG reduction. Over time,
Medicare will increase the amount initially withheld from DRG
payments, and new quality measures will be added. Id.
101. Id.
102. Medicare, Medicaid, and State Child Health Insurance Program Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-1(a) (2006)). The
demonstration began in April 2005 and concluded in March 2010. All
ten physician groups are participating in a two-year transition
demonstration, which began in January 2011. Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Medicare Physician Group Practice
Demonstration: Physicians Continue to Improve Quality and
Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-forPerformance Demonstration 9 (2011), https://www.cms.gov/
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to value using a shared savings model. The demonstration used shared
savings to encourage cost efficiency and quality improvement by
allowing participating physician groups to retain a portion of the
savings generated by reducing the cost of managing the health of a
defined population of Medicare patients and improving quality.103
The demonstration was structured to compare the annual
expenditure growth of the PGP-participating patient population to
that of the local nonparticipating patient population. Patients who
received the largest share of their services from the participating
group practice were assigned to the PGP for expenditure
comparison.104 If the group practice successfully held expenditures for
its assigned patients more than two percent below the target, the
practice was eligible for a performance payment of a percentage of the
total savings.105 Medicare received the remaining amount.106 An
additional quality performance payment was determined, based on the
group’s achievement of thirty-two quality measures.107 If all targets
were met, the PGP received the maximum quality performance
payment; however, Medicare retained a portion of the payment if the
PGP did not meet all targets.108 Data for these quality measures were
derived from claims submissions and patient record abstractions.109
Building on the shared savings approach in the PGP
demonstration, Congress created the Medicare Shared Savings
Program in the ACA.110 The program encourages providers to develop
accountable care organizations, or ACOs, which bring together
disparate groups of providers to assume responsibility for the medical

Medicare/Demonstration-Projects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/
PGP_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
103. John Kautter et al., Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration
Design: Quality and Efficiency Pay-for-Performance, 29 Health Care
Fin. Rev., no. 1, 2007, at 15, 16. The project required a higher level of
administrative and clinical capability, which limited participation to ten
large physician groups viewed as having the capacity to respond to the
incentives and track the necessary quality measures. Id. at 17.
104. Id. at 18. Patients who received a plurality of their outpatient
evaluation and management services from the participating PGP during
a given year were eligible for assignment. Id.
105. Id. at 21.
106. Id. Initially, the group practice retained eighty percent of the savings,
while Medicare retained twenty percent. In the third, and final, year of
the demonstration, both parties shared in the savings equally. Id.
107. Id. at 24.
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 25.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a) (Supp. V 2011).
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care delivered to a population of patients.111 The providers who
assume responsibility for the care of the population are encouraged to
coordinate care, reduce costs, and improve quality.112 ACOs can take
on a variety of organizational forms,113 but a series of statutory
requirements apply to all participating entities.114
The shared savings payment structure still relies on the Medicare
fee-for-service system, but the value-based element of shared savings
encourages providers to meet cost reduction benchmarks and rewards
them if they hold down costs.115 To establish a relative baseline
against which the ACO’s performance will be measured, the ACO and
Medicare will agree on the historic costs of providing medical care to
the patient population assigned to the ACO, taking into account the
anticipated changes in health care costs for factors like age and health

111. David Newman, Cong. Research Serv., R41474, Accountable
Care Organizations and the Medicare Shared Savings
Program 8 (2010).
112. Id. at 2.
113. While hospitals are not a necessary part of an ACO, the government
believes they will be central to their creation because hospitals are
better positioned to provide capital for increased staffing, health
information technology investments, and electronic health records
deployment. In addition, hospitals have the legal resources to contract
with the government and other providers, and they are better positioned
to develop integrated care processes. See id. at 7–8 (discussing reasons
why ACO integration is likely). These hospitals could employ physicians
directly through an integrated delivery system, or they could enter into
joint ventures with independent physician practices and operate a nonemployee medical staff. See id. at 4 (comparing the characteristics of
various models of hospitals). Other forms of ACOs do not require
hospitals at all. Instead, they rely either on associations of independent
physician practices that contract jointly with health plans to coordinate
care and improve quality, or they involve virtual physician networks led
by individual physicians or local foundations capable of providing
leadership and infrastructure to coordinate care. Id.
114. All ACOs must agree to: (1) become accountable for the quality, cost,
and care of the Medicare beneficiaries assigned to them, (2) participate
in the program for at least three years, (3) have a formal legal structure
to allow for the receipt and distribution of shared savings payments to
providers and suppliers, (4) include sufficient primary care professionals
to provide care to the beneficiaries assigned to ACO, (5) have at least
5,000 fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to the ACO, (6) create a
leadership and management structure that includes administrative and
clinical systems, and (7) define processes to promote evidence-based
medicine, patient engagement, quality and cost measures, and care
coordination. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(A)–(G) (Supp. V 2011).
115. See Newman, supra note 111, at 9 (describing the benefits of using an
ACO in Medicare fee for service).
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status.116 ACOs that enroll in the traditional Shared Savings Program
will assume no risk for failing to achieve savings, and providers will
still receive the full Medicare fee-for-service rate regardless.117 Those
ACOs that achieve savings relative to the baseline will retain a
portion of that amount to be distributed to providers according to the
organization’s individual business arrangement with ACO
stakeholders.118 Performance based on Medicare-defined quality
measures will also affect the portion of savings retained by
the ACO.119
The government believes the prospect of sharing in any savings
generated creates an incentive to reduce the volume and intensity of
medical procedures, while the potential to receive a bonus for
achieving quality performance measures reduces the likelihood that
providers will stint on care. And, while most quality measures will
likely consist of simple process metrics initially, CMS is expected to
continue developing more sophisticated, evidence-based quality
measures and reporting requirements for future implementation.120 As
providers continue to adopt electronic health record (EHR) systems
and conform to the meaningful use regulations,121 the Medicare
program will be positioned to take advantage of providers’ clinical
monitoring capabilities and use abstracted EHR data to assure quality
of care. The implications of this capability regarding the development
of a new Medicare regulatory structure are discussed in Part V.

116. Id. These beneficiaries will be assigned based on where they receive the
majority of their primary care in the prior year. Id.
117. Id. More advanced integrated care providers participating in the Pioneer
ACO model will face downside risk by being held accountable for a
portion of the losses relative to the benchmark. See Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Pioneer Accountable Care
Organization (ACO) Model Program: Frequently Asked
Questions 3 (2012), http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/x/Pioneer-ACOModel-Frequently-Asked-Questions-doc.pdf. In the third year of the
program, Pioneer ACOs will transition to a population-based payment
model, which replaces a significant portion of the fee-for-service system
with a per-beneficiary per-month payment that resembles capitation. Id.
The results of this model will be used to inform future rulemaking
related to the Shared Savings Program. Id. at 1.
118. Newman, supra note 111, at 9.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
121. To receive incentive payments under the Medicare and Medicaid
Incentive Programs, which help offset the cost of implementing new
EHR systems, providers must certify that they are “meaningfully using”
EHR technology by meeting objectives established by CMS. The
requirements for eligible professionals and hospitals appear at 42 C.F.R.
§ 495.210 (2012).
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D.

Bundling Payments by Episode of Care

Episodic payment bundling is an alternative to fee-for-service
payment that packages the payments of multiple providers into a
single lump sum payment corresponding with the treatment of a
patient’s condition.122 Instead of Medicare reimbursing hospitals under
Part A and physicians and other professionals under Part B, the
program encourages all providers to coordinate treatment across
multiple specialties and deliver more efficient care, while ensuring
quality through monitoring and improvement protocols.123 CMS has
developed a series of payment bundling models as part of a
demonstration project established by the ACA.124 While the models
have subtle differences, each of them attempts to bundle all services
associated with inpatient care with those services needed for a defined
period after discharge from the hospital. Since the bundled payment
establishes a target for a given condition, all providers, including
hospitals, physicians, and related health practitioners involved in the
patient’s treatment and recovery up to 30-90 days post-discharge,
have an incentive to hold costs below the bundled amount and share
the savings.125 If costs for treating the patient for the condition exceed
the target, the provider must pay the difference back to Medicare.126
While there may be consensus among policymakers that the
Medicare program can no longer pay for medical services using a
reimbursement model that encourages overtreatment and poor
122. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Bundled Payments
for Care Improvement Initiative: Frequently Asked Questions
4 (2012) [hereinafter Bundled Payment FAQs], available at
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/Bundled-Payments-FAQ.pdf
(describing how various models of payment function).
123. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Bundled Payments for
Care Improvement Initiative: Fact Sheet 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Bundled Payment Fact Sheet], available at http://www.phprwi.
com/Partner_Resource_Docs/Fact-Sheet-Bundled-PaymentFINAL82311.pdf.
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011). Each of the three
retrospective payment models use agreed-upon targets calculated using
the historical costs of providing care for specified conditions and then
discounting those costs to arrive at a bundled payment for the episode.
Providers still bill using the fee-for-service system, but the final amount
paid by Medicare is reconciled with the target. When providers remain
below the target, they are permitted to retain the excess payment;
however, providers do not receive additional payments if costs exceed
the target. The prospective model uses established payments that are
automatically distributed to the hospital, which then has the
responsibility of distributing the bundled payment across involved
providers. See Bundled Payment Fact Sheet, supra note 123, at 3.
125. Bundled Payment Fact Sheet, supra note 123, at 3.
126. Bundled Payment FAQs, supra note 122, at 4.
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coordination of care,127 significant regulatory barriers remain. As Part
I discussed, the regulatory framework currently in existence is highly
complex and was structured to combat fraud and abuse in the fee-forservice system.128 The difficulties imposed by the current regulatory
structure on the implementation of new value-based payment methods
and care delivery reforms are significant. Part III examines these
difficulties and begins to critique the approach that CMS has taken to
alleviate some of the restrictions posed by the fraud-and-abuse
regulations.

III. Value-Based Reimbursement and the Existing
Regulatory Framework
Provider efforts to implement value-based reimbursement models
will almost certainly be met with an array of conflicts related to the
existing fraud-and-abuse regulatory framework. As mentioned above,
the existing regulatory structure was designed to combat abuse of the
fee-for-service reimbursement system. To preserve the financial health
of the federal health care programs, legislators and regulators focused
on indirect control over financial relationships and ownership interests
among providers. Now, in an era of integrated care delivery and
changed financial incentives, physicians must begin to develop
relationships in ways that conflict with these existing regulations.
While it remains possible to implement value-based reimbursement
programs under current regulations, doing so curtails the scope of the
program, and it requires innovative providers to assume the risk that
their arrangement could become the first example of what is not
permitted under existing regulations. As a result, providers have
moved forward, if at all, with an abundance of caution that could
chill innovation and impact the timeline for adopting cost-reducing
payment models.
A.

Conflicts with the Anti-Kickback Statute

Currently, the anti-kickback statute does not provide a safe
harbor for the gainsharing-type arrangements found in shared savings
payment models. Though the statute is intent-based, and thus
requires the government to prove that a payment was made with
knowledge to induce referrals, providers would still seek to minimize
liability by fitting the gainsharing payments into an existing safe
harbor or by requesting an advisory opinion from the OIG. The most

127. See Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systematic Approach to Containing
Health Care Spending, 367 New Eng. J. Med. 949, 950 (2012) (noting
the views of several prominent health policy experts and their support
for the accelerated adoption of fee-for-service alternatives in Medicare).
128. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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favored safe harbor under the statute, however, is not even a safe
harbor at all. As noted in Part I, the statute does not define
“remuneration” to include money paid as compensation to bona fide
employees.129 This broad exception has led many large integrated care
providers to employ physicians to avoid scrutiny under the statute.
Another option available to providers seeking to shield
gainsharing-type payments from anti-kickback scrutiny is the safe
harbor for personal service arrangements and management contracts.
As discussed in Part I, the requirements for the safe harbor are
complex.130 The most difficult requirements, however, are that
aggregate compensation paid to the physician over the term of the
agreement be set out in advance, consistent with fair market value,
and not take into consideration the volume or value of referrals.131 For
hospitals attempting to make shared savings payments to physicians,
these requirements present risks because hospitals may not know the
aggregate dollar figure of payments at the beginning of the agreement.
Additionally, determining the fair market value for shared savings
payments presents problems because the payments are outside the
“existing paradigm of fair market value fees being measured in terms
of hours of service provided.”132 Because of these difficulties and
uncertainties, providers are often unwilling to rely on the purported
protection of the safe harbor. Providers who choose to rely on the
incomplete protection of the safe harbor cite the intent requirement as
a primary justification. With contemporaneous documentation and a
business justification for the payments, some providers are willing to
proceed without any greater protection on the basis that knowledge to
pay remuneration to induce referrals could not be proven in any
enforcement action.133
One remaining option for providers who have sought a greater
level of protection has been to request an advisory opinion from OIG.
OIG has issued several advisory opinions approving gainsharing
arrangements between hospitals and identifiable groups of

129. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
131. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (2012) (establishing all of the requirements
that must be met in order to exclude payments that would otherwise
constitute remuneration under the statute).
132. Robert F. Leibenluft et al., Hospital-Physician Collaborations: Antitrust
and Health Care Fraud and Abuse Considerations, in Health Law
Handbook 251, 270 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2009).
133. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-355, Medicare:
Implementation of Financial Incentive Programs Under
Federal Fraud and Abuse Laws 20 n.68 (2012) [hereinafter GAO
Financial Incentive Report].
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physicians.134 Approved gainsharing plans have included payments
made by hospitals to cardiology and radiology groups at a rate of fifty
percent of the annual savings achieved by physician implementation
of cost-saving recommendations.135 Providers opting for an advisory
opinion face significant costs—and risks—as the requesting party
must pay OIG to evaluate the proposal and prepare an advisory
statement.136 Furthermore, the requesting party must seek review of
an existing or proposed financial arrangement, since OIG will not
respond to hypotheticals or general questions of interpretation.137 Any
advisory opinions issued by OIG are binding only between the
requesting party and the Secretary of HHS.138 While many
organizations and their legal counsel look to these advisory opinions
for guidance in structuring their financial incentive programs, the
opinions do not provide an absolute shield from liability, and the
slightest difference in circumstances could affect the applicability of
the advisory opinion to the relying party’s arrangement.139
B.

Conflicts with the Stark Law

The potential for liability under the Stark law is much broader.
As mentioned in Part I, the statute imposes strict liability on
violators unless their conduct falls within one of the recognized
exceptions. In the context of shared savings and ACOs, the Stark law
would be easily implicated because of the compensation arrangements
involving physicians who make referrals to the hospital for designated
health services.140 Similar to the anti-kickback statute, there is no
Stark exception that applies directly to shared savings or other
incentive payments. The absence of explicit protection under the
strict liability statute leaves providers with a patchwork of existing
exceptions that provide only limited protection to value-based
payment programs.
Perhaps the most comprehensive protection offered by the Stark
law as it relates to gainsharing is the exception for bona fide
employment relationships. Under this exception, the agreement must
134. Claiborne et al., supra note 78, at 489.
135. Id. at 489 n.249.
136. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 12–13, 13
n.49.
137. Id. at 12 n.46.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id.
140. Carrie Valiant, Stark Law Implications for ACOs: Fitting a Square Peg
into a Round Hole, Accountable Care News, Jan. 2011, at 1, 7,
available at http://www.ebglaw.com/files/42796_Valiant-AccountableCare-News-Stark-Law.pdf.
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show that employment is for identifiable services, the amount paid is
consistent with fair market value, the amount does not take into
consideration the volume or value of any referrals, and the amount
paid is commercially reasonable.141 In large part, this exception
protects the distribution of shared savings between hospitals and
employed physicians. Lingering risks include ensuring that payments
to physicians remain consistent with fair market value and that
payments are commercially reasonable; however, the measurability of
fair market value for services meeting a “clinically based outcome
measure for a financial incentive program to improve quality” is
unclear.142 To overcome this difficulty, some agreements ensure that
total physician compensation, including all incentive payments and
other sources of income, remains consistent with fair market value.143
To meet the requirement that payment not depend on volume or
value of referrals, some incentive payment plans are structured to pay
physicians the same amount of money, regardless of their contribution
to the savings generated.144 The effects of rewarding physicians equally
for making an unequal contribution to achieve savings may have
adverse effects on changing physician habits and improving the
quality of care;145 however, such a review is beyond the scope of
this Note.
More complex issues arise when the relationship between
coordinating parties does not involve an employment relationship
protected by the broad bona fide employment exception. Hospitals
seeking to distribute shared savings payments to non-employed
physicians have sought protection under the personal services
arrangement exception146 and fair market value compensation
exception.147 While some minor differences exist between the
exceptions, parties seeking to meet the requirements of either
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2) (2006).
142. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 21.
143. See Kevin G. McAnaney, Kim Mobley & Claire Turcotte,
American Health Lawyers Association Annual Meeting:
Governance Best Practices for Physician Compensation and
Contracting 34–38 (June 28–29, 2011) [hereinafter AHLA Best
Practices],
available
at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/
Programs/Materials/ Documents /AM11/mcananey_mobley_turcotte_
slides.pdf (presentation describing some of the issues associated with the
fair market value and “set in advance” requirements under Stark and
noting that fair market value analysis should be performed on total
compensation, including incentive-based components).
144. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 21.
145. Id.
146. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(d) (2012).
147. § 411.357(l).
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exception have faced similar difficulties. Both exceptions require that
compensation under the agreement: (1) be set out in advance; (2) be
consistent with fair market value; (3) not take into account the
volume or value of referrals or other business generated by the
referring physician; and (4) be commercially reasonable.148 Unlike with
the employment exception, the personal services exception often is not
applied in situations where hospitals can bundle the physician’s base
salary and the incentive-based compensation received from a
gainsharing arrangement together to perform a fair market value
analysis. In the employment context, hospitals receive greater
protection from errors in fair market value calculations because a
sizable portion of the compensation (the base salary) can be verified
by third party surveys. The personal services arrangement and fair
market value exceptions, in contrast, are typically reserved for
physicians who are not employed by the health system, and thus a
significant portion, if not the entirety, of the physician’s payment
from the health system is derived from shared savings payments for
which no objective third party fair market value survey exists.
Structuring compensation arrangements in ways that have not
been explicitly approved by CMS creates a significant risk for
providers. Performing fair market value analysis on incentive-based
payments, as alluded to above, is difficult, if not impossible, and CMS
has not provided certainty in this area. Additionally, it is difficult for
hospitals and health systems to know at least one year in advance
what the total compensation under the agreement will be; however,
CMS has been receptive to the inclusion of formulas that will be used
to calculate incentive-based compensation that is subject to outcome
metrics.149 As with the anti-kickback statute, providers have the
option of seeking an advisory opinion from CMS. While the published
opinion binds only the requesting party and the Secretary of HHS,150
other parties have relied on the language to craft incentive payment
programs consistent with what CMS has previously sanctioned. Some
parties cite the statistic that CMS and OIG have not taken any Stark
or anti-kickback enforcement actions regarding pay-for-performance or
gainsharing arrangements from 2005 to 2010.151 The threat of
becoming the first provider targeted by such an enforcement action,
however, has caused providers to implement programs with caution.152
148. Id.; § 411.357(d).
149. See AHLA Best Practices, supra note 143, at 34 (noting that
quality-based payments to independent contractor physicians may meet
the “set in advance” requirement for Stark if the formula is set forth in
the agreement).
150. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 12.
151. Id. at 23.
152. Id.
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As discussed below, the lack of clarity and protection offered to
providers attempting to implement value-based payment models using
a regulatory framework directed toward fee for service has a chilling
effect that could unnecessarily delay innovation.
In an early attempt to address these issues, CMS, in 2008, issued
a proposed rule153 outlining an exception for incentive payment
programs and shared savings programs.154 The 16-element exception
adopted many of the safeguards that were adopted in favorable OIG
advisory opinions related to gainsharing under the anti-kickback
statute.155 The rule was never finalized, and HHS later stated that it is
questionable “how a physician self-referral exception could be
designed given that any new exception under [Stark] must present no
risk of program or patient abuse.”156 Providers have since relied on
favorable advisory opinions issued by CMS that contain many of the
provisions of the proposed rule; however, parties relying on advisory
opinions that are not binding between themselves and the Secretary of
HHS will not likely receive any legal immunity.157
C.

Conflicts with the CMP Statute

The CMP statute creates a straightforward prohibition on
gainsharing initiatives in which providers receive a share of the
savings generated from reducing or limiting care in any way,
regardless of medical necessity.158 Unlike with the anti-kickback
statute and the Stark law, the CMP statute does not provide a
measure of protection in the form of a safe harbor or exception if
153. Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee
Schedule and Revisions to E-Prescribing Exemption Amendment, 73
Fed. Reg. 38,502, 38,604 (proposed July 7, 2008).
154. Claiborne et al., supra note 78, at 487.
155. Id. The proposed rule would have guarded against some of the risks
associated with gainsharing, including: “limitations on costly services
(‘stinting’); favoring of healthier or cheaper patients (‘cherry picking’);
disfavoring of sicker or more expensive patients (‘steering’);
inappropriately limiting length of stay (‘quicker and sicker discharge’);
or generating abusive referrals through improperly increased percentage
payments to physicians or manipulating outcomes data.” Id. The
proposed rule allowed gainsharing programs to last up to three years
and required that: at least five physicians participate in each quality
measure, all physicians in a given department be permitted to
participate, and all physicians be on the medical staff at the outset of
the program. Id. at 487–88.
156. Notice of Meeting, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,039, 57,041 (Sept. 17, 2010); see also
Valiant, supra note 140, at 8 (quoting the notice in the Federal
Register).
157. Claiborne et al., supra note 78, at 488.
158. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
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certain requirements are met. Providers attempting to create narrow
gainsharing arrangements are instead left to rely on nonbinding
statements from the OIG that offer no guaranteed protection from
penalties, except as between the Secretary and the entity to which the
opinion is addressed.159
Recently, the OIG has allowed for “carefully tailored” gainsharing
agreements that meet certain requirements.160 While this measure of
relief allowed for some gainsharing arrangements to proceed, nearly all
of them have been limited to individual service lines,161 particularly in
the form of clinical co-management agreements. Even where other
providers attempt to strictly replicate a gainsharing arrangement that
OIG has explicitly approved, the impact the programs have on
achieving high quality and value is limited because of the constraints
that OIG places on the program.162 Without changing the way in
which the CMP statute is applied and enforced, however, the statute
would continue to present the “most direct constraints on the
financial and clinical integration between physicians and hospital[s]
where the goal of integration is efficiency.”163 As a result of this
limitation on the expansion of high-value care, the broad applicability
of the CMP statute was a prime candidate for reform when Congress
was contemplating the transition from fee-for-service to value-based
payment.

IV. The Legislative Response: Fraud-and-Abuse
Waivers
As part of the ACA, Congress granted waiver authority to the
Secretary of HHS that would allow for provisions of the anti-kickback
statute, the Stark law, and the CMP statute to be waived in
connection with approved demonstration projects.164 CMS exercised
159. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
160. Furrow et al., supra note 22, at 1080; see also supra note 83
(describing the characteristics of approved gainsharing arrangements).
161. Id.
162. See GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 31 (noting
that permissible gainsharing arrangements are narrow and permit
specific cost-saving limitations, for instance limits on use of certain
surgical supplies and product substitutions). Another limitation in
approved gainsharing arrangements is that payments for financial
incentives must also be distributed equally per capita, regardless of the
level of effort by the physician. Id.
163. Leibenluft et al., supra note 132, at 267–68.
164. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
3022(f), 124 Stat. 119, 398 (2010) (provision codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1395jjj(f) (2012)).
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this new waiver authority and promulgated an interim final rule with
comment (IFC) that specified five waivers applicable to the Medicare
Shared Savings Program.165 These waivers are self-executing, broad in
their applicability, and provide specific protection for ACO preparticipation activity,166 participation in approved ACOs,167
distribution of shared savings payments,168 compliance with the Stark

165. 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 67,993 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
ch. IV–V).
166. Id. at 68,000. The ACO Pre-participation Waiver waives applicability of
the anti-kickback statute, the Stark law, and the CMP statute for ACO
activity that pre-dates the effective date of the ACO participation
agreement, so long as certain requirements are met. Parties must make
a good faith attempt to develop an ACO that will participate in the
Shared Savings Program, as evidenced by contemporaneous
documentation of diligent steps to create a governance structure,
leadership, and management. A description of the arrangement must be
publicly disclosed. The Pre-participation Waiver protects start-up
activity that would otherwise violate the three fraud-and-abuse
provisions for the one-year period preceding the application’s due date
with the Secretary. Id.
167. Id. at 68,000–01. The ACO Participation Waiver waives the three fraudand-abuse provisions for all ACO activities related to an ACO’s
participants or any combination of its providers and suppliers, if certain
requirements are met. The ACO must have entered into a participation
agreement and remained in good standing; the ACO meets governance,
leadership, and management requirements; the ACO’s governing body
has made a bona fide determination that the arrangement is reasonably
related to the Shared Savings Program purposes; and all such
determinations are contemporaneously documented and made available
to the Secretary for a period of ten years following completion of the
arrangement. The waiver becomes effective on the start date of the
participation agreement and ends six months following the expiration of
the agreement. If CMS terminates the agreement, however, the waiver
period will end on the date of termination notice. Id.
168. Id. at 68,001. The Shared Savings Distribution Waiver applies to all
three fraud-and-abuse provisions, if all of the conditions are met. The
ACO must be in good standing with a participation agreement; shared
savings must be earned by the ACO pursuant to the Shared Savings
Program; and shared savings must be earned by the ACO during the
term of the participation agreement, even if distribution occurs after the
agreement expires. Distributions must be paid to providers/suppliers or
participants who were a part of the ACO during the year in which
shared savings were earned, or distributions must be used for activities
that are reasonably related to the purpose of the Shared Savings
Program. Id. Additionally, with regard to the CMP statute, the waiver
applies to payments made directly or indirectly from hospital to
physician but not knowingly to induce the physician to “reduce or limit
medically necessary items or services to patients under the direct care of
the physician.” Id.
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law,169 and protection for patient incentive payments.170 The ACA also
permits the Secretary to waive application of the fraud-and-abuse
provisions to pilot programs on payment bundling, which would
include the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative;171
however, CMS has not yet issued comprehensive language on what
these waivers will require.
While the scope of the waivers provided under the Shared Savings
Program is significant and may provide a measure of relief to
providers who were previously unwilling to take risks by structuring
value-based arrangements under the existing regulations, the evidence
shows that many more questions exist regarding long-term reliance on
these waivers. This Note argues that the reliance on regulatory
waivers functions as the government’s admission that the current
regulatory structure is at odds with the ACA’s focus on delivering
high-value health care through ACOs. Though this is an important
realization for the government, there are consequences to proceeding
in a manner where CMS limits the use of waivers to providers
participating in approved demonstration projects during only the
period of participation. Without changes to the applicability and use
of waivers, CMS will chill the adoption of these payment reforms by
creating uncertainty about providers’ long-term protection under the
waivers and by creating two tiers of health care innovation.
One of the primary concerns that providers have under the ACO
waiver program is the time-limited nature of the protection afforded
to the financial relationships created as part of an ACO. The
American Hospital Association (AHA) has expressed concern about
potential future changes to the IFC without having the opportunity
169. Id. The Compliance with the Physician Self-Referral (Stark) Law
Waiver waives application of the anti-kickback and CMP provisions to
any financial relationship between an ACO and its participants or
providers/suppliers that implicates the Stark law. The waiver requires a
participation agreement in good standing, a financial relationship that is
reasonably related to the purpose of the Shared Savings Program, and a
financial relationship that fully complies with an existing Stark
exception. Id.
170. Id. The Waiver for Patient Incentives protects ACOs who provide
services to participants or its providers/suppliers that are free or below
fair market value, if all requirements are met. The ACO must have a
participation agreement in good standing; there must be a reasonable
connection between the items or services and the care of the beneficiary;
the services must be in-kind; the items or services are preventive care
items, or they advance a clinical goal of adherence to a treatment
regime, drug regime, follow up care plan, or management of a chronic
disease. Id.
171. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 3023(d), 124 Stat. 119, 403 (2010) (provision codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395cc-4(d) (2012)).
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to comment further.172 Perhaps more concerning is the potential for
CMS to modify the terms of the ACO waivers after the initial
participation agreement between the provider and CMS expires.
Under this scenario, the AHA fears that waiver protections could be
subsequently altered or removed altogether, thus exposing providers
to additional unexpected requirements at a minimum, and potential
legal risks if CMS or the OIG choose to enforce existing regulations
without regard for the provider’s adherence to the previous waiver
requirements.173
The GAO’s research on provider behavior validates the AHA’s
concerns regarding industry hesitance to structure financial
relationships under the protections afforded by the waiver program. A
recent report cites the time-limited nature of the protection as a
major impediment to the broad-based formation of new integrated
relationships.174 Providers have instead chosen to rely on the
“constraints of existing exceptions and safe harbors” and the advisory
opinion process.175 As a result of the continuing reluctance to seek an
advisory opinion because of the time, cost, and uncertainty involved,
providers are “more likely to implement only those programs that
mirror already approved programs or none at all.”176 As noted above,
the narrowness of the previously approved programs limits the scope
that new programs can take.177
The AHA has taken issue with another aspect of the ACO
waivers related to the narrowness of their application and the
potential effects that such exclusive application could have on the
development of other “clinically integrated organizations.”178 The
letter expresses a desire to provide all health programs the same
opportunity to participate in care coordination improvements, so that
all patients “have the same opportunity to benefit from quality and
172. Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Assoc., to
Marilyn Tavenner, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
& Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. Office of Inspector Gen. 1–2 (Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter AHA
Letter], available at http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2012/
120103-cl-cms-1439-ifc.pdf.
173. Id. at 4.
174. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 36–37.
175. Id. at 36.
176. Id. at 37. The GAO found that the average cost for obtaining an
advisory opinion ranges from $15,000 to $50,000, can take over a year to
get a final determination, and requires an actual or contemplated
business arrangement that is more than a mere hypothetical. Id. at 30–
31.
177. See discussion supra Part III.C.
178. AHA Letter, supra note 172, at 1.
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care coordination.”179 In addition to the above finding indicating that
providers are hesitating to rely on time-limited waivers, the GAO
noted that not all health systems are eligible for or even willing to
participate in federal demonstration projects for which they could
receive a waiver.180 For providers opting to experiment with financial
incentive arrangements with private payers outside of the Medicare
Shared Savings Program, the GAO cited significant risks and
complications with structuring such arrangements because of the
inevitable spillover into the Medicare patient population.181 Thus,
while providers seek to operate private value-based payment
arrangements within the existing Stark, anti-kickback, and CMP
framework, the potential for liability in areas previously discussed still
remains, with no protection offered by the fraud-and-abuse waivers.182
It is now clear that the American health care system is at a
crossroads. The government’s decision, as embodied in the ACA, to
move toward value-based payment for health services is likely to
continue at a growing pace in the coming years.183 While the
government deserves credit for moving away from the costly and
ineffective fee-for-service reimbursement model, serious conflicts with
the underlying regulatory framework remain and must be addressed.
Regulatory waivers are a clear recognition of the current regulatory
framework’s incompatibility with value-based payment design, but
179. Id.
180. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 37.
181. See id. at 22 (noting that legal experts found it “difficult to separate
commercial patients from Medicare patients for the purposes of financial
incentive programs” and that programs “limited to commercial patient
populations may ‘spill over’ to Medicare patients”). Providers
implementing ACO-type arrangements with private payers rely on the
existing safe-harbor and exception framework, often using the
employment exception to protect from inadvertent inclusion of Medicare
patients in the shared savings program. Id. The number of health care
providers who are able to take advantage of this protection through
direct physician employment is, however, comparatively limited. In such
instances, providers must rely on other ill-suited safe harbors and
exceptions, such as the requirements for personal services arrangements
and management contracts. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.
182. See discussion supra notes 166–170 (noting that protection by each of
the fraud-and-abuse waivers is limited to providers who have a Medicare
Shared Savings Program participation agreement on file or under review
by CMS).
183. An article written by leading health policy experts recommends
converting at least seventy-five percent of payments in every region to
fee-for-service alternatives within the next ten years. Emanuel et al.,
supra note 127, at 950. This will inevitably include payments under the
shared savings and bundled payment models that conflict with the
existing regulatory limitations.
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the waivers do not present the comprehensive, long-term solution that
is required to speed the adoption of innovative payment
methodologies both within and outside the Medicare program. Part V
begins by exploring some of the immediate changes that CMS should
consider under its existing waiver authority. It then moves to a
discussion on the long-term regulatory options that legislators and
policymakers should consider as value-based payment models become
the new normal.

V. A New Approach to Regulating Health Care in
the Value-Based Payment Era
Regulatory waivers may provide a temporary means to achieving
the desired end of paying for value, but the government’s reliance on
waivers should be simply that—temporary. The discriminatory effect
that the current waivers have on providers who do not qualify for or
choose not to participate in CMS-sanctioned demonstration projects is
counterproductive to the goal of achieving broad participation in
value-based payment models. CMS’s ability to waive fraud-and-abuse
provisions in order to achieve the integrated payment and referral
relationships functions as a recognition that the existing regulations
inhibit the necessary formation of those relationships and no longer
reflect the priorities of preventing fraud and abuse in the modern era.
While it is unlikely that a wholesale elimination of these
regulations is likely anytime in the near future, CMS must explore
long-term alternatives that can provide certainty in how health care
organizations can structure future financial and care delivery
relationships. Future regulations should build on the approach taken
in the Shared Savings Program and focus on preventing fraud and
abuse through accountability and transparency using the expanded
capabilities of health information technology.
A.

Interim Reforms for Immediate Consideration

The GAO has noted that CMS’s authority to issue waivers under
provisions of the ACA is broader than its authority to promulgate
new exceptions under the Stark law.184 In order to create an exception
to Stark, the proposed arrangement must present “no risk” of
“program or patient abuse.”185 As CMS concluded in 2008 with the
proposed gainsharing exception, the “no risk” standard for new Stark
exceptions in an era of experimentation and uncertainty often
prevents large-scale changes from taking place.186 Realizing that

184. GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 18.
185. Id.
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exceptions and safe harbors for the underlying regulatory framework
are unlikely in this period of transition from fee for service to
payment for value, CMS should instead focus on correcting the
shortfalls with the current waiver process.
First, CMS should provide more certainty to providers
participating in alternative payment models covered by fraud-andabuse waiver authority by extending the waivers’ coverage
indefinitely, so long as providers continue to meet obligations specified
in the participation agreement and the objectives set by CMS at the
outset of the program. This was the position taken by the hospital
industry187 in response to CMS’s promulgation of the IFC in
November 2011;188 however, CMS has not released any updated waiver
language in response to these concerns.
Second, CMS should expand the coverage of waivers to other
alternative payment programs and provide immediate guidance to
providers through rulemaking. As of March 2013, CMS has not
promulgated waiver language through rulemaking with respect to
other demonstration programs that could potentially run afoul of the
fraud-and-abuse regulations currently in force.189 Providing guidance
to organizational leaders contemplating participation in these
innovative care delivery programs could minimize uncertainty without
undue risk to the Medicare program. As part of the waiver language
promulgated by CMS, the agency should provide guidance to
providers who treat Medicare patients and are participating in valuebased payment arrangements not sanctioned by CMS. As noted in
Part IV, the risk that nonparticipating providers will run afoul of the
Medicare fraud-and-abuse regulations while participating in private
ACO-type arrangements has chilled the formation of innovative
relationships across a large swath of organizations that may not be
186. See id. at 18–19 (noting that the “no risk” requirement for new Stark
exceptions presented a “challenge in providing broad flexibility for
innovative, effective programs while at the same time protecting the
Medicare program and patients from abuses”).
187. See AHA Letter, supra note 172, at 2, 4 (noting that the Shared Savings
Program waivers should be finalized in their current form and that
changing the rules for organizations that seek to renew their contracts
after meeting performance standards could undermine innovation and
the development of new delivery models).
188. 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. IV–
V).
189. With respect to the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative,
CMS has indicated that the Secretary may choose to exercise waiver
authority provided in the ACA and that such waivers would be included
in individual agreements with CMS. See Bundled Payment FAQs,
supra note 122, at 8–9. Broadly applicable and self-executing waivers
similar to those in the Shared Savings Program promulgated through
rulemaking, however, have not been published.
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participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program and subject to
the expansive waivers it provides.
Third, after extending the scope of coverage under the waivers as
recommended above, CMS should finalize the IFC and protect
providers’ reliance by indicating that future changes will proceed
through notice and comment rulemaking and that changes will not
retroactively apply to participation agreements already in effect. CMS
should, however, retain the authority to modify the waiver with
respect to individual entities if objectives of the Shared Savings
Program are not met, or if fraud-and-abuse concerns necessitate
modification or termination of the organization’s participation
agreement. Upon the expiration of participation agreements after the
initial three-year ACO term, CMS should refrain from imposing
changes on participating providers who were operating under the
initial waiver language, unless individual circumstances require
changes in the participation agreement to protect program integrity.
As the AHA noted, seeking to impose changes on ACOs who have
successfully achieved CMS’s objectives could undermine the efforts
providers have made to structure incentives and provider
relationships.190
These recommendations are, of course, only a temporary solution
that will bridge the gap between a health care system moving toward
value-based payments and a regulatory structure tailored to an
antiquated fee-for-service model. As paying for value continues to gain
traction, the government must recalibrate its approach to regulating
fraud and abuse.
B.

Ideas for Long-Term Regulatory Reform

As policy experts and government regulators contemplate future
fraud and abuse protections, special consideration should be given to
the effectiveness of the safeguards put in place during the initial phase
of the Shared Savings Program. As part of their agreements with
CMS, entities participating in the demonstration projects must agree
to stringent reporting and compliance requirements that exceed the
requirements placed on nonparticipating providers, likely as a result
of the relaxed application of the fraud-and-abuse provisions. If this
alternative to the existing regulatory framework is successful,
Congress should consider, and CMS should provide guidance on, ways
in which this alternative form of regulation could be expanded to all
providers once value-based payments become the predominant form of
health care reimbursement.
In order to maintain a participation agreement in good standing
with CMS and benefit from the broadly worded regulatory waivers,
providers must agree to expansive new quality reporting,
190. AHA Letter, supra note 172, at 4.
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accountability, and transparency requirements.191 First, ACOs must
establish or designate a legal structure with a governing body that
can ensure management accountability and transparent compliance
with quality performance standards.192 Second, the ACO must develop
patient centered processes using evidence-based medicine and
beneficiary engagement and integrate those processes into the
organization’s health care teams.193 Third, the ACO must furnish data
demonstrating adherence to quality of care metrics established by
CMS, subject to a medical record audit and data validation.194
Fourth, CMS is permitted to employ a range of methods to “monitor
and assess the performance of ACOs,” including analysis of quality
measurement data and beneficiary and provider complaints, coding
audits, and electronic health record reviews.195 Fifth, each ACO must
publicly report information disclosing all joint venture agreements and
members of the governing body, all shared savings and loss
information, and aggregate data related to patient experiences and
quality of care.196 While ACOs are subject to many additional
requirements, these major provisions are most instructive for
discussing what policymakers should consider when formulating future
fraud-and-abuse regulations.
The government’s reliance on this form of regulation could be an
important first step in moving away from the structural framework
characterized by generally applicable safe harbors and exceptions to
direct regulation of providers through contractual agreements
requiring transparent and accountable care.197 As increasing numbers
191. See GAO Financial Incentive Report, supra note 133, at 33 (noting
that an ACO’s “continued participation in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program is contingent on its performance” and CMS may “terminate an
ACO’s participation in the program based on the agency’s findings”).
192. 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.104–425.106 (2012).
193. 42 C.F.R. § 425.112 (2012).
194. 42 C.F.R. § 425.500 (2012).
195. 42 C.F.R. § 425.316(a)(2) (2012). When read in conjunction with 42
C.F.R. § 425.506, where CMS strongly encourages providers to adopt
electronic health record systems, the review of patient health records
will require reviewing them in their electronic form. See 42 C.F.R. §
425.506 (noting that ACOs are “encouraged to develop a robust EHR
infrastructure” and that “[p]erformance on [the quality measures
regarding EHR adoption] will be weighted twice that of any other
measure for scoring purposes and for determining compliance with
quality performance requirements”).
196. 42 C.F.R. § 425.308 (2012).
197. This is an approach for which Professor Kristin Madison of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School advocates. See Madison, supra
note 42, at 422. Madison favors an approach that is less reliant on
indirect structural regulation that attempts to micromanage the referral
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of providers become “meaningful users” of electronic health record
(EHR) technology, the prospect of adopting a framework of fraudand-abuse regulation that relies on strict data reporting requirements
becomes even more likely. Indeed, one of the provisions of the
meaningful use regulations, which all providers must meet in order to
qualify for federal financial assistance for EHR adoption under the
HITECH Act,198 is for providers to monitor a growing set of clinical
quality measures (CQMs).199 By expanding the quality reporting
requirements under the meaningful use regulations and strongly
encouraging the use of electronic health records going forward,200 the
government can engage in a new form of fraud-and-abuse regulation
that promotes the creation of integrated provider relationships yet
still protects the Medicare program from fraud and abuse.
It is difficult to predict what role the anti-kickback statute, the
Stark law, and the CMP statute will play in a health care system that
relies on waivers from their expansive prohibitions in order to deliver
coordinated and value-driven health care. Though it is difficult to
predict the fate of these particular statutes, it is not impossible to
glean some insight into how the government envisions the future of
fraud-and-abuse regulation. In a recent article, Daniel Levinson, the
Inspector General for HHS, hinted that certain provisions of these
statutes might still be applicable for providers who violate the terms
of the Shared Savings Program participation agreement and the
associated waivers. Levinson mentioned that the government
“retained authorities to redress identified problems,” that the
“integrity requirements embedded into the SSP and the waivers
would mitigate the risk of harm in the first instance, and that residual

relationships and compensation arrangements between providers.
Instead, she favors expanding the use of information technology,
especially electronic health record systems, to better discern the quality
of care received by patients and tailoring payments to the value received
by patients, as dictated by objective quality metrics. Id.
198. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
199. For fiscal year 2014, hospitals must begin to monitor twenty-four
clinical quality metrics related to patient engagement, patient safety,
care coordination, population and public health, efficient use of health
care resources, and clinical processes and effectiveness using the
electronic health record system. See Electronic Health Record Incentive
Program Stage II, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,698, 13,759 (proposed Mar. 7, 2012)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 412, 413, 495).
200. The HITECH Act mandates Medicare payment adjustments take effect
in 2015 if providers have not become meaningful users of electronic
health records, with exceptions for a narrow set of circumstances. See
id. at 13,700–01 (describing payment adjustments and exceptions).
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risk could be remediated through appropriate government action.”201
For those who violate their contractual obligations, Levinson notes
that the government may take action using “enforcement authorities
that were not waived” and other “administrative tools”202 to address
“harms associated with kickbacks and referral payments, including
overutilization, increased costs, and substandard or poor quality
care.”203 Levinson’s comments indicate that the government may
intend to rely on the safeguards in the participation agreements and
waivers as a long-term policy solution. The statutes from which
providers receive a waiver would seemingly remain in effect and, in
conjunction with other non-waived provisions, namely the False
Claims Act, function as a punitive backstop that applies once
providers violate their participation agreement or the waiver
requirements.
Parsing the words of government regulators may provide some
indication of the future of the underlying statutes that comprise the
fee-for-service regulatory framework, but little is known with
certainty. Recent statements by the Inspector General indicate that
the statutes will remain in place with undefined enforcement
applicability. The extent to which the anti-kickback, Stark, and CMP
statutes would serve a valuable purpose when other regulatory
provisions, namely the False Claims Act, are capable of protecting
against overutilization, increased costs, and substandard or poor
quality care will certainly be debated in the future. What cannot be
disputed now, however, is that waiving the applicability of these
statutes more broadly in the short term is a necessary step during this
period of transition. But, as the delivery model continues to shift
toward integrated systems capable of delivering efficient, high quality
care in the future, waivers will prove to be an increasingly inadequate
and unreliable long-term policy solution. So, in contemplating postfee-for-service fraud-and-abuse regulation, policymakers must
recalibrate their approach by implementing a framework that reflects
the incentives created by a value-based payment system and
capitalizes on the new functionality of EHR data repositories.

Conclusion
The American health care system is undergoing rapid change that
involves a shift from fee-for-service payment to value-based payment
that depends heavily on care coordination and provider integration.
Underlying this shift in payment methodologies is a regulatory
201. Daniel R. Levinson, A New Era of Medicare Oversight, 15 J. Health
Care L. & Pol’y 249, 261 (2012).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 261 n.57 (quoting Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared
Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 68,008 (2011)).
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structure that was originally designed to tackle fraud-and-abuse
schemes arising out of the fee-for-service payment system. The way
Medicare pays for services is undergoing significant change, yet the
fraud-and-abuse regulations inhibit developing integrated provider
arrangements as part of value-based payment programs. Legislators
provided some flexibility in the form of regulatory waivers that will
allow for short-term experimentation and transition; however, the
approach has several deficiencies that should be addressed in the near
term. Going forward, the regulation of fraud and abuse in a health
care system that is encouraging the development of larger, highly
integrated care delivery systems must keep pace. A new regulatory
framework must consider the changed incentives that have resulted
from value-based payments and capitalize on the new capabilities that
EHR systems offer in delivering high quality care.
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